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COMMENTS
HARRIS V. REED: A NEW LOOK AT FEDERAL HABEAS
JURISDICTION OVER STATE PETITIONERS
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts cannot exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction over state
prisoners whose convictions rest on adequate1 and independent2 state
procedural grounds.3 State judges, however, often fail to state clearly the
basis of their decisions.4 Ambiguous state court decisions frequently oc-
cur where a petitioner presents a federal claim and the state court's opin-
ion addresses both federal and state issues. Moreover, state courts often
render judgment without issuing an opinion.5 On direct' or habeas7 re-
1. A state law is adequate when it provides a constitutionally sufficient basis on
which to render judgment. See Matasar & Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Doctrine, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1291, 1292 n.2 (1986). For a discussion of the process by
which courts determine adequacy, see infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
2. A state law is independent where a court can apply and construe it without refer-
ence to federal principles. See Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243
U.S. 157, 164 (1917); see, eg., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 571 n.3 (1988)
(state ground not independent where state court felt bound by fourth amendment in con-
struing its law); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985) ("when resolution of the state
procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of
the court's holding is not independent of federal law ... "); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653 (1979) (state ground not independent because state court felt compelled by fed-
eral principles to construe state law as it did). For a discussion of methods used to deter-
mine whether state procedural grounds are adequate and independent, see infra notes 95-
104 and accompanying text.
3. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1977). A petitioner who can, how-
ever, demonstrate cause for noncompliance with the procedural rule and actual prejudice
will obtain access to a federal habeas forum. See id. at 87. For a discussion of the ade-
quate and independent state grounds doctrine and the cause and prejudice test, see infra
notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
Federal courts have power to address the merits of claims that are procedurally barred
in state court. They do not exercise this power, however, out of respect for the state
system. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); infra note 26.
4. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1041-42 (1989); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1038-39 (1983). For a discussion of ambiguous decisions, see Note, Applying Wain-
wright v. Sykes to State Alternative Holdings and Summary Affirmances, 53 Fordham L.
Rev. 1357, 1360-63 & nn. 18-32 (1985); infra notes 128-142 and accompanying text.
5. See 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice & Pro-
cedure § 4032, at 769 (1977).
6. On direct review, which encompasses all appellate proceedings, a superior court
examines whether a lower court properly decided issues of law. See L. Yackle, Postcon-
viction Remedies § 1, at 1 (1981); see also 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 17, at 91 (1957)
(discussing appellate review). The superior court's inquiry is limited to those issues tried
in the lower court. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 17, at 91 (1957); see also Note, State
Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 422, 426-27 (1966)
(contrasting direct and habeas review).
7. A defendant uses habeas corpus after having exhausted appellate procedures. It is
not an appeal but a collateral suit. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83
(1971); United States v. Theodorou, 576 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Habeas
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view, federal courts must struggle to divine whether state courts have
relied on state or federal grounds in reaching their decision.8
Prior to 1989, federal courts interpreted ambiguous state court deci-
sions in one of three ways. Some courts demanded explicit reliance on
the state ground before they would decline jurisdiction.9 Others deter-
mined the basis of the state court's decision on a case-by-case basis.'" A
third group of courts presumed reliance on a state procedural ground if
the state court so much as mentioned such an issue."'
Recently, in Harris v. Reed, 2 the Supreme Court attempted to elimi-
nate this confusion in the habeas context. 1" Harris held that where the
last state tribunal to render judgment in a case failed to articulate the
basis of its decision, federal courts should presume reliance on federal
grounds and exercise jurisdiction."' Therefore, a state prisoner's proce-
dural default'5 will bar access to a federal habeas forum only if the state
court's opinion plainly indicates reliance on a state rule.'
6
Part I of this Comment explores the background of federal habeas ju-
risdiction over state prisoners. This section includes a discussion of the
adequate and independent state grounds doctrine and the cause and prej-
udice test. Part II discusses the Harris decision itself. Part III addresses
the majority's goals and argues that Harris will not achieve these objec-
tives. Part IV discusses probable effects of the decision and demonstrates
corpus is independent of the proceedings by which petitioner was convicted. See 39
C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 3, at 463 (1976). Prisoners use habeas corpus to challenge the
legality of confinement, not to contest errors in lower courts. See id. at 462.
8. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1041-42 (1989); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1038-39 (1983).
9. See, e.g., Bruni v. Lewis, 847 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir.) (exercising jurisdiction
because state court addressed procedural default and merits), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 403
(1988); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (same).
10. See, eg., Wesselman v. Seabold, 834 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1987) (analysis of state
law revealed that Kentucky applied procedural default rule to bar petitioner's claim),
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1024 (1988); Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir.
1983) (analysis of Utah Supreme Court's opinion revealed that state court relied on mer-
its, not procedural default); Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1034 n.4 (11th Cir.
1983) (exercising jurisdiction because Florida Supreme Court extensively analyzed merits
while addressing procedural default only in footnote), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984),
cert. granted and vacated, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985); Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 132 (8th
Cir. 1981) (finding reliance on procedural default after analysis of state court opinion).
11. See Bond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 310-11 (3d Cir. 1989); Bridge v. Lynaugh,
860 F.2d 162, 163 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated, 863 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1989); Davis v. Lan-
sing, 851 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1988); Goins v. Lane, 787 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986); Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 176 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982).
12. 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989).
13. See id. at 1041.
14. See id. at 1045.
15. A procedural default occurs where a criminal defendant fails to comply with a
state procedural rule. A state court will address the merits, if at all, only as an alternative
holding. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1316 (1961).
16. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1044.
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that Harris will either eviscerate the cause and prejudice test or compel
changes in state court opinion writing.
I. BACKGROUND
Habeas corpus is a traditional method of challenging imprisonment;17
it is not part of the original criminal proceeding, nor is it concerned fun-
damentally with the determination of guilt or innocence. Its primary in-
quiry is into the conviction process. 18 The usual remedy available to
prisoners who successfully attack their convictions is release from cus-
tody.19 Criminal defendants, however, are not automatically entitled to
federal habeas forums. Congress authorized federal courts to exercise
habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners where the applicant is in custody,
presents a federal question and has exhausted all state remedies. E°
The exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners is fur-
ther limited by the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.21
This doctrine immunizes from federal habeas review state decisions rest-
ing on adequate and independent state grounds, absent a showing of
17. See generally W. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus (1980) (his-
torical analysis of federal habeas corpus and state prisoners); L. Yackle, supra note 6,
§§ 1, 15-20 (development of rules governing federal habeas jurisdiction over state prison-
ers); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Forfeitures Resulting from Assigned
Counsel's Refusal to Raise Issues on Appeal, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 850, 850-52 & nn. 1-3
(1984) (scope of federal habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners).
18. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 151-57 (1970); Note, supra note 6, at 422-24; 39 C.J.S. Habeas
Corpus § 6 (1976); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-24 (1979) (federal
habeas courts must consider whether sufficient evidence existed for jury to find guilt be-
yond reasonable doubt).
19. See Hill v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 439, 440 (5th Cir. 1976); Kelly v. Wingo, 313 F.
Supp. 1059, 1060 (W.D. Ky. 1970); L. Yackle, supra note 6, § 3, at 4-5.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
In pertinent part, section 2254(a) provides that federal courts "shall entertain an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Id.
Section 2254(b) further provides that "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State." Id.
Section 2254(c) provides in pertinent part that "[alan applicant shall not be deemed to
have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
Id. For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement, see infra notes 86, 105-112 and ac-
companying text.
At the time of its enactment, the statute codified existing common-law doctrines. See
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11 (1963); see, e.g., Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114,
116-17 (1944) (reaffirming common-law exhaustion requirement); Waley v. Johnson, 316
U.S. 101, 105 (1942) (federal habeas jurisdiction "extends also to those exceptional cases
where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused");
L. Yackle, supra note 6, § 19, at 90.
21. See Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1130,
1147 (1986).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
cause and prejudice.22
Traditionally, the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
has applied to habeas petitions.23 The Supreme Court's 1963 decision in
Fay v. Noia,24 however, represented a temporary departure from strict
application of the doctrine in habeas cases.25 Under Noia, the presence
of an adequate and independent state ground did not bar state prisoners
from federal habeas forums.2 6 Federal courts, however, could deny
habeas applications of defendants whose strategic decisions resulted in
their procedural defaults.27 Fourteen years later, Wainwright v. Sykes28
effectively overruled Noia by prohibiting the exercise of federal habeas
jurisdiction where petitioner's conviction rested on adequate and in-
dependent state grounds.29 But petitioner could still obtain habeas re-
view upon a showing of cause for the default and consequent prejudice.3"
22. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
484-85 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). For a discussion of how courts determine adequacy
and independence, see infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
cause and prejudice test, see infra note 30.
23. Originally, the doctrine limited the Supreme Court's power to review state court
decisions on direct appeal. See California v. Freeman, 109 S. Ct. 854, 856 (1989); Michi-
gan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4 (1983); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945);
Fox Film, 296 U.S. at 210; Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 636
(1874).
The Court later expanded its application to the federal habeas arena. See Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1965); Bramble v. Heinze, 350 U.S. 899, 899 (1955)
(per curiam); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471,
477-78 (1945); Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1913).
24. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
25. See id. at 438. Noia is representative of the Court's jurisprudence in the federal
habeas area at that time. Other decisions of this period also fostered greater merits re-
view of state prisoners' claims in federal habeas cases. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 15-29 (1963) (circumstances in which federal habeas courts may grant succes-
sive habeas applications); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310-12 (1963) (circumstances
in which federal habeas courts must hold evidentiary hearings).
26. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 437. The Court justified this action by stating that prior use
of the doctrine had "rarely, if ever" been predicated on a lack of power, but rather, had
been based on deference to the state system. See id. at 425. The Court has consistently
affirmed this notion. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); Reed v. Ross, 468
U.S. 1, 9 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977).
27. This is the "deliberate by-pass" exception. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,
517 (1972) (only petitioner, not counsel, can deliberately by-pass state procedural rule);
Noia, 372 U.S. at 439 (only "'an intentional relinquishment.., of a known right or
privilege'" constitutes deliberate by-pass) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)).
28. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
29. See id. at 87-88.
30. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). See generally Francis v. Hender-
son, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (first applying cause and prejudice standard to exercise of
federal habeas jurisdiction); Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) (court may excuse waiver where
cause shown). The Court refused to give precise content to the cause and prejudice test.
See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91; see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (rationale for
not specifically defining test). However, one can cull examples of cause from the Court's
decisions. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (failure to raise claim not
reasonably available to counsel because of legal novelty constitutes cause); Murray v.
HARRIS v. REED
31Sykes remains the governing standard in federal habeas cases.
Several rationales have been advanced for adhering to the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine. One is that use of the doctrine
avoids advisory opinions.32 One commentator has suggested that the
Court employs the doctrine to maintain the integrity of state procedural
laws. 3 Some courts and commentators have suggested that federal
courts exhibit disrespect for the state judiciary by granting either direct
or habeas review of cases involving adequate and independent state
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause);
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (failure to raise legally novel claim constitutes cause);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485-86 (1953) (court may excuse procedural default where
interference by officials makes compliance with procedural rule impracticable).
The Court has also addressed prejudice. See, e.g., Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (prejudice
results from fundamental unfairness); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982)
(prejudice results when error by itself infects entire proceeding and violates due process).
There are rare instances where a state prisoner may gain access to a federal habeas
forum despite the existence of adequate and independent state grounds and no showing of
cause and prejudice. One such instance occurs where the petitioner will be the" 'victim[]
of a fundamental miscarriage of justice'" without federal adjudication of the claim. See
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)); Sykes, 433
U.S. at 90-91; see also Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1219 (1989) (" 'substantial'
showing 'that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing deter-
mination'" is a fundamental miscarriage of justice) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 539); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 546-50 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (barring petitioner from federal habeas forum because of minor procedural
default in capital case could be fundamentally unfair). A fundamental miscarriage of
justice occurs where one is "actually innocent." See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 537
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496).
For an explanation of the cause and prejudice standard and fundamental miscarriage
of justice test, see Marcus, Federal Habeas Corpus After State Court Default: A Definition
of Cause and Prejudice, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 663 (1985); Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v.
Noia: Procedural Defaults By Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 341,
397-406 (1978); Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel:
The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 19-46, 56-67 (1978); Comment,
The Supreme Court Defines the Wainwright v. Sykes "Cause" and "Prejudice" Standard,
19 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441 (1983); Comment, The Federal Courts: Habeas Corpus and
Recent Meanings of Cause and Prejudice, 10 Am. J. Crim. L. 215 (1982).
31. See Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1215 (1989).
32. See Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310, 1311 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.); Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945);
Westling, Comment: Advisory Opinions and the "Constitutionally Required" Adequate
and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 379, 386-87 (1989); Develop-
ments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
1324, 1332-33 (1982).
The presence of an adequate and independent state ground implies that a federal
court's conclusion on federal issues cannot affect the outcome of the case on remand.
Once remanded, the state court could simply reinstate its original ruling by relying on the
state ground. Invocation of the doctrine, which precludes the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion, thus prevents rendering advisory opinions. See Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26; see, e.g.,
People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 494 N.E.2d 444, 445, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (1986)
(per curiam) (United States Supreme Court rendered advisory opinion because upon re-
versing federal issues and remanding to New York Court of Appeals, New York court
reinstated original ruling by relying solely on state grounds).
33. See Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 750, 765
(1972).
1989]
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grounds.34 Finally, Justice Kennedy has noted that the doctrine helps
reduce the case load of the federal courts.35
II. HARRIS V. REED
A. Procedural History
Harris was convicted of murder after a three-day jury trial in the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.36 On direct appeal, the Appellate
Court of Illinois rejected Harris's claim that the evidence was constitu-
tionally insufficient to support the conviction.37 This was the only argu-
ment that Harris's appointed counsel presented.38
Harris then petitioned for state post-conviction relief on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied his petition,39 holding
that Harris was procedurally barred from presenting his ineffective assist-
ance claim because he failed to preserve it on direct appeal." Neverthe-
less, the court also addressed and rejected this claim on the merits.41
In deciding whether to exercise habeas jurisdiction over Harris's peti-
tion, the federal district court concluded that the Illinois appellate post-
conviction court had excused Harris's waiver and actually dismissed the
claim on the merits.42 The district court therefore assumed jurisdiction
and ordered an evidentiary hearing to assess the merits of the claim.43
Ultimately, it dismissed Harris's petition.'
Harris appealed the district court's decision to the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit,45 which affirmed the judgment on jurisdictional
34. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983); Matasar & Bruch, supra note
1, at 1309-12; Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals
for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 187, 201 (1965) (federalism concerns, not
advisory opinion rationale, underlie adequate and independent state grounds doctrine).
But see Westling, supra note 32, at 386-87 (1989) (advisory opinion rationale is doctrine's
basis).
35. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1054 n.6 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); cf
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 584 (1979) (prisoner actions consume federal judiciary's
time and energy). But see The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 100,
247 (1986) (habeas applications from state prisoners comprise small percentage of federal
docket).
36. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1040. Citation to the Supreme Court's opinion is neces-
sary because the state trial court's opinion is unpublished.
37. See United States ex rel. Harris v. Reed, 608 F. Supp. 1369, 1373-74 (N.D. Ill.
1985), aff'd, Harris v. Reed, 822 F.2d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1038,
1045 (1989); see also People v. Harris, 71111. App. 3d 1113, 392 N.E.2d 1386 (1979) (the
Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed Harris's conviction without opinion, and therefore,
reference to federal decisions is helpful).
38. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1039.
39. See Harris, 608 F. Supp. at 1377.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1378.
43. See id. at 1385.
44. See Harris v. Reed, 822 F.2d 684, 685 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1038
(1989).
45. See id. at 684.
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grounds.46 It concluded that the district court improperly exercised
habeas jurisdiction, reasoning that the Illinois appellate post-conviction
court had actually relied on the procedural bar. 7 It found that the state
court addressed the merits only as an alternative holding.4"
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.4 9 The Court acknowledged the difficulty of
ascertaining whether a state court relied on an adequate and independent
ground where the state court rendered an ambiguous decision." The
Court had addressed this issue previously in the context of state litigants
seeking direct review in the Supreme Court."1 In Michigan v. Long,52 the
Court formulated the plain statement rule:5 3
[w]hen ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not
clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reason-
able explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so. 54
The Court reasoned that because federal courts confront common ju-
risdictional dilemmas on habeas as well as direct review, it was appropri-
46. See id. at 687.
47. See id.
48. See id; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (Seventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion of ambiguous state court opinions prior to Harris).
49. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1045 (1989).
50. See id. at 1042; cf Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.) (difficulties
involved, prior to Harris, when federal court confronted ambiguous state court opinions),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982); Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 451-52 (2d Cir.
1981) (same), cert denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982).
51. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). For a discussion of direct and col-
lateral review, see supra notes 6-7.
52. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
53. The Long Court adopted the plain statement rule to demonstrate "respect for
state courts, and.., to avoid advisory opinions." Long, 463 U.S. at 1040; see supra note
32.
The Long Court believed that adoption of the plain statement rule exhibits respect for
state procedural rules because federal courts no longer have to interpret them. See Long,
463 U.S. at 1041. Prior to Long, the Supreme Court on direct review had to construe
state law to determine the basis for the state decision. See infra note 85. The plain state-
ment rule eliminates this task and is therefore intended to be deferential. In reality, how-
ever, the plain statement rule greatly intrudes on the state judiciary's autonomy. See
Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1052-53 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); supra notes 9-
11 and accompanying text. See generally Elison & NettikSimmons, Federalism and State
Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 Mont.
L. Rev. 177, 195-200 (1984) (explanation and critique of Michigan v. Long plain state-
ment rule); Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship Between State and Fed-
eral Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1118 (1984)
(consequences of Michigan v. Long).
54. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
1989]
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ate to apply the Long plain statement rule in the habeas arena." Under
Harris, "a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal
claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court render-
ing a judgment in the case 'clearly and expressly' states that its judgment
rests on a state procedural bar."5 6
The majority believed that its decision would resolve a disagreement
among the circuits and foster judicial efficiency. 7 The Court also be-
lieved that adopting the plain statement rule would reduce the need to
construe state law,58 further promoting judicial efficiency. 9
Concurring in the result,'c Justice Stevens stated that "the concerns
that prevented me from joining the majority opinion in Michigan v. Long
are not present in [habeas] case[s]." 61 Specifically, Justice Stevens con-
tended that the rule in Long "expanded this Court's review of cases in
which state courts had overprotected their respective citizens."62 Justice
Stevens believed that review of this sort is seldom appropriate.6 3 How-
ever, because federal habeas cases address a prisoner's claim that his fed-
eral rights have been violated, Justice Stevens agreed that a presumption
of jurisdiction in ambiguous cases is appropriateA4
Justice O'Connor also concurred in the result.65 She stressed that
while the majority simultaneously applied the "miscarriage of justice"
test 66 and the cause and prejudice standard, the latter alone is opera-
tive.67 She added that the law requiring petitioners to exhaust state rem-
edies prior to federal habeas adjudication was unaffected by the plain
statement rule.68
55. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1043 ("Faced with a common problem, we adopt a com-
mon solution.").
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1041; supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing division
among circuits).
58. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1044 (1989).
59. See id.; Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). Harris will improve judi-
cial economy inconsequentially. See infra note 85.
60. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1045-46.
61. See id. at 1046.
62. Id. at 1045. The Long presumption indicates over-protection because Justice Ste-
vens assumes that the state is appealing a state court decision that broadly construed
federal rights. See id. at 1045 (Stevens, J., concurring); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1067-68 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1045 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens maintained that federal courts on direct review should primarily secure federal
rights and not question all state court decisions "involving overly expansive interpreta-
tions of federally protected rights." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. See id. at 1046 (Stevens, J., concurring).
65. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1989).
66. See supra note 30.
67. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1048; supra note 30.
68. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1046 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Hence, a federal court
must still examine state law to determine whether the petitioner, upon presenting a claim
for the first time in habeas application, has exhausted state remedies. See generally Davis
v. Armontrout, No. 88-1194 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (explaining Justice O'Connor's concurrence); Littlejohn v. Higgins, No. 88-0641
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Justice Kennedy, dissenting from the opinion,69 stated that "it is most
unreasonable to adopt a rule that assumes either that state courts rou-
tinely invoke exceptions to their procedural bars without saying so, or
that those courts are in the habit of disregarding their own rules."7 ° He
asserted that if the majority desired a bright-line rule in these cases, it
should make the opposite assumption.7" Refusing jurisdiction, Justice
Kennedy reasoned, reflects a more reasonable presumption that the state
court applied its rule.72
Justice Kennedy added that applying the plain statement rule to
habeas cases will not significantly reduce the federal courts' need to ex-
amine state law73 because the doctrines of adequacy and exhaustion still
compel a thorough examination of state law.74 Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy predicted that state judges would not plainly indicate reliance
on a state procedural rule because they may be unfamiliar with the intri-
cacies of federal habeas procedure.75 This would compel federal courts
to exercise habeas jurisdiction in a larger number of cases, further swell-
ing the federal docket.76 Finally, Justice Kennedy asserted that the deci-
sion burdened states' legitimate interest in finality and undermined their
right to punish defendants.77
(W.D. Mo. May 4, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (same); infra note 86 (ex-
haustion principle).
While federal courts can exercise jurisdiction when there is no plain statement, they
may not presume that a newly presented claim is exhausted. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at
1046 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor reasoned that a state court cannot
rely on a state procedural rule where petitioner has never presented the claim to the state
judiciary. See id. The majority, in a footnote, adopted Justice O'Connor's position. See
id. at 1043 n.9; see also Parker v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1470, 1477-78 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (refus-
ing jurisdiction because petitioner never presented claim to state courts).
69. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1048.
70. Id. at 1050; see also Peterson v. Scully, No. 89-2202 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file) ("the state argues [that] to hold that the Appellate
Division reached the merits would amount to a declaration that the court was unaware of
[the procedural] rule and committed an error of elementary state law.").
71. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct 1038, 1051 (1989).
72. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Kennedy noted that federal
courts are empowered to hear the habeas applications in question but refuse to do so
because of comity and federalism. See id. at 1052. Therefore, "any determination that a
state court did not intend to rely on a procedural default must be made with the same
deference to the State's sovereignty that motivates our willingness to honor its procedural
rules in the first place." Id. at 1053.
73. See id. at 1051 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 1051, 1055 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 1053-54 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 1054 n.6 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 1053 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also found that Harris
and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), express contradictory principles. See Harris v.
Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1055 (1989). In Engle, the Court held that where petitioner first
presents a claim in his federal habeas petition, a federal habeas court must examine state
law to determine whether he has exhausted all state remedies. See id. at 1055.
Therefore, Engle compels construction of state law in the exhaustion area. See Harris,
109 S. Ct. at 1046-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority in Harris, however, as-
sumes forgiveness of procedural defaults and prohibits an examination of state law to
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III. HARRIS V REED WILL NOT ACHIEVE ITS STATED GOALS
A. Providing Guidance to the Circuits in Construing Ambiguous State
Court Decisions
Admittedly, Harris will provide some guidance to lower federal courts
in construing ambiguous state decisions.7" The decision, however, may
well provoke further confusion concerning the interpretation of the plain
statement rule, leading courts to dispute determinations of ambiguity.7 9
Some will require literal plain statements, while others will be satisfied
with mere efforts at clarity before refusing jurisdiction.80 For instance,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found a plain statement from
the tone of a state court opinion.81 Yet the state court addressed the
merits and never expressed clearly its reliance on a procedural bar. 2
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit refused to exercise jurisdiction even
where the state court opinion addressed the merits.8 3 In contrast, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit exercised jurisdiction because
the state court did not issue a plain statement, despite its belief that Vir-
ginia intended to hold petitioner's claim procedurally barred .8  Even if
Harris does provide guidance in some areas, this sort of confusion can
now infect habeas decisions. Harris may well substitute one kind of con-
fusion for another.
B. Judicial Efficiency
Harris will not substantially promote judicial economy. The decision
will eliminate the need to construe state procedural rules in making a
Sykes jurisdictional decision. The doctrines of adequacy, independence
determine the accuracy of this assumption. See id. at 1056 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy does not believe that these principles are reconcilable. See id.
78. Lower federal courts now know how to construe ambiguous opinions. See supra
notes 9-11 and accompanying text. Under Harris, an ambiguous decision will not bar
federal habeas review. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1043-44.
79. See Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal
Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 799, 810 (1985).
80. See, e.g., Waye v. Townley, 884 F.2d 762, °764 (4th Cir.) (refusing to exercise
jurisdiction because lower state court held claim procedurally barred, even though Vir-
ginia Supreme Court affirmed without opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989); Fierro
v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 1276, 1281 (5th Cir. 1989) (even though Texas Supreme Court
addressed merits, Fifth Circuit found plain statement where state court declared that
"[n]othing is presented for review").
81. See Anselmo v. Sumner, 882 F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1989).
82. See id. at 434.
83. See Richardson v. Thigpen, 883 F.2d 895, 898 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 17 (1989); Pelmer v. White, 877 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1989).
84. See Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 123 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Nieto v.
Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 746-47 & n.2 (10th Cir.) (despite procedural default, court exer-
cised jurisdiction because New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed merits of petitioner's
constitutional claim and did not plainly indicate reliance on default), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 373 (1989).
85. For instance, in County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), the Court found that
the New York Court of Appeals had not relied on a state procedural default. See id. at
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and exhaustion, 6 however, compel lower federal courts to construe state
procedural rules in other aspects of habeas cases.8 7 In addition, Harris
will force federal courts to adjudicate many more claims by state prison-
ers.88 Thus, in practice the decision contributes little to judicial econ-
omy.89 Indeed, federalism concerns demand that federal courts
accurately assess whether the state court relied on a procedural default.90
The Court ostensibly adopted the plain statement rule in deference to the
state judiciary. 91 Yet the rule presumes that state courts do not rely on
their procedural laws.92 Far from demonstrating its avowed respect for
the power and independence of state courts,93 the Harris decision tram-
ples federalism concerns while only marginally increasing efficiency. 94
153. In reaching this conclusion, the Court first examined many New York cases inter-
preting the law to determine whether it applied to petitioner's claim. See id. at 150-52 &
nn. 8-9. The Court also analyzed the trial and appellate opinions to discern reliance on
the default or the merits. See id. at 152-53; see also Peterson v. Scully, No. 89-2202 (2d
Cir. Feb. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cir file) ("[o]ur review of the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision is made easier by the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Harris v.
Reed") (citation omitted).
Harris eliminates only the need to perform a small portion of this analysis. Federal
courts must still examine the lower court record, appellate briefs and state procedural
rules in other aspects of habeas cases. See infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
86. Congress requires state prisoners to exhaust all state remedies before obtaining
access to a federal habeas forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)-(c) (1982); supra note 20.
Federal courts, however, will refuse to exercise jurisdiction only when petitioner has
failed "to exhaust state remedies still open ... at the time he files his application in
federal court." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963).
A petition for certiorari is not required to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149 n.7 (1979); Noia, 372 U.S. at 435-38; cf. Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 217 (1950) (requiring a petition for certiorari before petitioner
could be considered to have exhausted state remedies), overruled, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 435-36 (1963).
Comity is the rationale for the exhaustion requirement. See Castille v. Peoples, 109 S.
Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Bowen v. Johnston,
306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939); Laubach, Exhaustion of State Remedies as a Prerequisite to Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus: A Summary 1966-1971, 7 Gonz. L. Rev. 34, 35-36 (1971). But see
Meyer & Yackle, Collateral Challenges to Criminal Convictions, 21 U. Kan. L. Rev. 259,
288 n.1 19 (1973) (ist of sources discussing other rationales for exhaustion). Exhaustion
is not a jurisdictional requirement. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 419-20; Darr, 339 U.S. at 204-
05.
87. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1054-55 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
89. See Anselmo v. Sumner, 882 F.2d 431, 433-34 (9th Cir. 1989).
90. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1052-53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).
92. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
93. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1052-53 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Robson & Mello, Ariadne's Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Proce-
dural Default, Adequate and Independent State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty, 76
Calif. L. Rev. 89, 122 & n.192 (1988).
94. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1055 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (because of adequacy,
independence and exhaustion, "the majority's assessment of the marginal burdens im-
posed on federal courts by the need to construe those rules in [ambiguous habeas] cases
... can only be described as extravagant"). The Court's decision in Harris intrudes on
1989]
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1. Adequacy and Independence
The majority in Harris asserted that the decision would conserve judi-
cial effort by eliminating the need to construe state law in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction.95 Even if a state court explicitly relies
on a state procedural bar, however, lower federal courts must still deter-
mine whether the state law is truly adequate and independent.96 This
requires an evaluation of state procedural rules,9 7 which may be inade-
quate for several reasons.98 For instance, a state procedural bar is inade-
quate to preclude federal jurisdiction where federal law preempts the
state rule.9 9 Inconsistenti °° or novel'01 application of the rule also ren-
state sovereignty because it compels state courts to write opinions. See infra notes 121-
123 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text (state
court may use one sentence statement of reliance rather than full opinion). Admittedly,
opinion writing is beneficial and worthy of encouragement. See Marvell, State Appellate
Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 Judicature 282, 287 (1988); infra notes 143-145
and accompanying text. The state judiciary, however, is currently deluged with cases.
See Marvell, supra, at 282-83; infra note 140. By punishing state courts that do not write
opinions, the Supreme Court has unjustifiably attempted to conserve federal judicial re-
sources through coercing greater expenditure of state energy.
95. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1044.
96. See id.; Robson & Mello, supra note 93, at 100; infra notes 97-103; see, e.g., Rus-
sell v. Rolfs, No. 88-3936 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file) (plain
statement of reliance on procedural bar will not preclude exercise of jurisdiction where
bar is inadequate). In Russell, the Washington state court adhered to the plain statement
rule; the state court plainly indicated reliance on a state procedural rule. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, found the rule inadequate, and thus could exercise
jurisdiction.
97. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 719-22 (3d Cir.) (examining
many Delaware cases and statutes to determine adequacy of state rule), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 403 (1988); infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (process by which courts
determine adequacy).
98. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 503 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that state procedural rules not always sufficient to preclude exercise of federal
habeas jurisdiction). See generally Matasar & Bruch, supra note 1, at 1383 (reasons for
holding state ground inadequate); Meltzer, supra note 21, at 1137-40 (same).
99. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 387-88 (1986);
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940).
100. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587-89 (1988); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457
U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964); Coleman v.
Saffie, 869 F.2d 1377, 1382-84 (10th Cir. 1989); Messer v. Florida, 834 F.2d 890, 892-93
(11th Cir. 1987).
For instance, in Coleman v. Saffie, 869 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit examined an Oklahoma statute and case law. The Oklahoma
courts alternatively enforced the rule, waived it, or required petitioner to satisfy newly
invented standards. See id. at 1383. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the state court
inconsistently applied the contemporaneous objection rule. See id.
101. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958); see, e.g.,
Allison v. Fulton-De Kalb Hosp. Auth., 449 U.S. 939, 941-42 (1980) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (application novel because state court's interpretation of procedural rule directly
conflicted with state statute); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958) (rule
"requir[ing] ... an arid ritual of meaningless form" is novel); Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d
1458, 1470-71 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (analysis of state law revealed rule's application
to facts was novel).
For instance, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964), the Court
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ders it inadequate. Inadequacy is found where the state courts have dis-
cretion to waive the rule.1°2 Finally, a state rule is adequate only if it
serves a legitimate state interest. 10 3 Thus, because federal judges are still
faced with the very significant task of assessing adequacy and indepen-
dence, it seems that the Supreme Court has overestimated Harris's im-
pact on the need to construe state law. 104
2. Exhaustion
The majority asserted that the plain statement rule reduces the need to
examine state procedural law, appellate briefs and lower court records. 1 5
Lower federal courts, however, must still determine whether the peti-
tioner has exhausted his state remedies. 106 This process requires federal
courts to examine state law, lower court records and appellate briefs. 17
A claim is not exhausted until the petitioner fairly presents it to the state
court0 8 and has no further recourse to state remedies.10 9 To determine
whether the petitioner fairly presented his claim, federal courts must ex-
held that failure to comply with the Alabama Rules of Court was an inadequate state
ground. See id. at 296-97. Petitioner's brief was in almost perfect conformity with the
rule. The Court found that "Alabama courts have not heretofore applied their rules...
with the pointless severity shown here." Id. at 297.
102. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449 n.5 (1965); Williams v. Georgia, 349
U.S. 375, 383, 389 (1955).
103. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965) (procedural rules not serv-
ing legitimate state interests should not "bar vindication of important federal rights"); cf
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (procedural default only bars federal habeas
jurisdiction if legitimate state ground exists).
In Allison v. Fulton-De Kalb Hosp. Auth., 449 U.S. 939, 942 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), Justice Brennan stated that a Georgia law requiring that defendants present
federal before state claims serves no legitimate state interest. See id. at 942-43. The
Georgia rule failed to foster judicial economy. While acknowledging that the rule pre-
vented defendants from awaiting favorable decisions in other cases, Justice Brennan rea-
soned that this rationale also applied to state claims. See id. Justice Brennan concluded
that "the Georgia Supreme Court's procedural rule effects an unnecessary and irrational
discrimination against federal constitutional claims." Id. at 943; cf. United States ex rel.
Fulton v. Franzen, 659 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1981) (Illinois contemporaneous objection
rule served legitimate state interests of finality and speed), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023
(1982). But see Meltzer, supra note 21, at 1142-44 (courts find state interest illegitimate
only when procedural rule substantially burdens assertion of federal rights).
104. Federal courts assess adequacy and independence only if a state court uses a plain
statement. When the decision is ambiguous, federal courts simply exercise jurisdiction.
See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1044 (1989). By exercising jurisdiction more fre-
quently, however, federal judges must expend their resources in disposing of a larger
docket. This frustrates the majority's attempt to foster judicial efficiency. See infra notes
113-116. See generally, Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959) (even thirty years ago, when Court's
docket was half current size, Justices had little time for each case).
105. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1044 (1989).
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982); supra notes 20, 86.
107. See infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
108. See Castille v. Peoples, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Exhaustion also requires that petitioner give the state courts a fair
opportunity to adjudicate the claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (per
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amine the record and appellate briefs.11° Federal habeas courts must
then ascertain whether any state remedies remain available," which re-
quires an examination of state procedural rules.'" 2 The exhaustion pro-
cess, therefore, casts further doubt on the majority's assertion that Harris
will result in a meaningful conservation of judicial resources.
curiam); Morgan v. Jackson, 869 F.2d 682, 684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 284
(1989); White v. Meachum, 838 F.2d 1137, 1138 (10th Cir. 1988).
109. See Middleton v. Miles, No. 88 Civ. 6099 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) ("[Tihe petitioner must show that he has utilized all available
appellate procedures at the state level.").
110. See Peoples v. Fulcomer, 882 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1989). In Fulcomer, the Third
Circuit "examined the record from the state court proceedings in the appendix submitted
on this appeal, which includes the trial court opinion .... [petitioner's] Superior Court
brief, and the unreported Superior Court opinion," and concluded that petitioner's inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim had not been fairly presented. Id. at 830-31.
In Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1048 (1984), the court extensively analyzed appellate briefs and New York law to
determine whether petitioner fairly presented his claim. The Second Circuit noted that
the appellate brief referred to New York cases that addressed the issue in state constitu-
tional terms. See id. at 193-94. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that, by referring to
these cases, petitioner put New York courts on notice of his federal constitutional claim.
See id.
111. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
112. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1054-55 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
For instance, in Peoples v. Fulcomer, 882 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1989), the court concluded
that petitioner had not exhausted state remedies. See id. at 831. An analysis of Penn-
sylvania's procedural law indicated that petitioner's waiver barred his ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim in state court. Normally, a procedural default satisfies exhaustion.
See Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1978); L. Yackle, supra note 6, § 53, at 235,
§ 60, at 253. The Third Circuit, however, believed that Pennsylvania courts would hear
the case. It based this conclusion on a Pennsylvania policy preferring that state prisoners
initially litigate post-conviction claims in its state courts. See Fulcomer, 882 F.2d at 832.
Other aspects of exhaustion also require federal courts to be familiar with state proce-
dural rules. For instance, petitioners have exhausted state remedies where state appellate
courts have discretion not to invoke the procedural rule. See White v. Meachum, 838
F.2d 1137, 1138 (10th Cir. 1988). Federal courts, therefore, must recognize rules provid-
ing for such discretion. See, e.g., Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1988) (peti-
tioner's remedies not exhausted because Article 78 motion was improper vehicle for
raising claim, which could still be raised on direct appeal); Hughes v. Stafford, 780 F.2d
1580, 1581 (11th Cir. 1986) (petitioner who did not seek certiorari in Georgia Supreme
Court failed to exhaust state remedies, because that court must grant certiorari); Adail v.
Wyrick, 671 F.2d 1218, 1219 (8th Cir. 1982) (state remedies exhausted despite peti-
tioner's failure to move for transfer to Missouri Supreme Court, because that court's
decision to grant motion is discretionary).
In addition, a petitioner need not pursue state remedies that are futile. See Castille v.
Peoples, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989); Varnell v. Young, 839 F.2d 1245, 1247-48 (7th Cir.
1988). To recognize futility, federal courts must understand state procedural law. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Tonaldi v. Elrod, 716 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1983) (state
remedies exhausted despite petitioner's failure to seek state post-conviction relief because
Illinois law does not offer access to post-conviction forum after petitioner has directly
appealed), cert. denied sub nora. Perri v. Lane, 484 U.S. 843 (1987); Seemiller v. Wyrick,
663 F.2d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 1981) (not futile for petitioner to seek state court review
because state law could favor petitioner's argument); United States ex rel. Graham v.
Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 1972) (goal of exhaustion requirement is to exhaust
state remedies, not prisoner).
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3. Increased Federal Docket Congestion
A final consequence of Harris is that many more prisoners will obtain
access to federal court.113 The resulting increase in the federal docket114
will further tax an already over-burdened judiciary."1 5 Having to adjudi-
cate a significantly increased number of claims by state prisoners will
hinder the promotion of judicial economy. 6 Moreover, the federal
courts' burden of having to handle substantially more cases will offset
any judicial efficiencies created by the Harris decision.
IV. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
A. A Change in State Court Opinion Writing
Through its decisions in Michigan v. Long and Harris v. Reed, the
Court may have hoped to induce state judges to write more opinions, and
to do so with greater clarity.117 The Court's strict interpretation of the
plain statement rule supports this theory.1 8 By requiring literal plain
statements before refusing to exercise jurisdiction, the Court has eased
113. See infra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
114. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1054 n.6 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
115. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.8 (1983); Hart, supra note 105, at
122-25; Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 Mercer L.
Rev. 477, 478 (1988).
116. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1053-54 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy as-
serted that state prisoners may flood state courts with successive habeas petitions in hopes
of obtaining an ambiguous decision. See id. To the extent that this occurs, federal courts
will have to exercise jurisdiction over greater numbers of state prisoners. See id at 1054
n.6. Furthermore, state justices will be hard pressed to improve their writing habits if
they are deluged with habeas petitions.
117. See Baker, supra note 79, at 825-26 (1985); Matasar & Bruch, supra note 1, at
1376. In addition, the Court may have hoped the plain statement rule would reduce the
frequency with which judges affirm without an opinion. See infra notes 127-134 and
accompanying text. For an illustration of how a state court may plainly rely on a state
ground, see O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 524, 523 N.E.2d 277, 278,
528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1988); People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 381, 515 N.E.2d 898, 901,
521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 215 (1987).
118. The Court has required explicit plain statements before refusing to exercise juris-
diction. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554, 559-60 (1987) (granting
certiorari despite Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion that state court issued plain state-
ment); New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 872-73 n.4 (1986) (Court exercisedjurisdiction notwithstanding state court opinion citing several New York cases and New
York constitution); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 n.3 (1986) (Court as-
sumed jurisdiction due to lack of plain statement); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 109-
10 (1986) (Court exercised jurisdiction because state court did not plainly indicate basis
for decision); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1984) (per curiam) (exercising
jurisdiction due to lack of plain statement); see also Robson & Mello, supra note 93, at
121 (Court frequently exercises jurisdiction due to lack of plain statement).
Some members of the Court, however, have been more willing to accept inexact state-
ments of reliance. See, e.g., Finley, 481 U.S. at 563 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court
should refuse jurisdiction because state law not interwoven with federal law); Van Ar-
sdall, 475 U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Meyers, 466 U.S. at 383 n.1 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (same).
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access to federal forums. 1 9 Yet an opposite interpretation of the plain
statement rule, obstructing access to federal forums, better serves judicial
efficiency. 120
One explanation for the Court's approach is that by permitting lower
courts to exercise jurisdiction frequently, it can use the threat of reversal
as a "stick" to persuade state courts to change their writing habits.1 21
Alternatively, state courts, by adopting a more conscientious writing
style, can immunize their decision from federal habeas review:1 22 "the
state court is given the opportunity for requiring deference to its plain
statement. When that plain statement is lacking, dual federalism allows
[federal courts] to treat the decision as within [their] domain." 123
Despite this opportunity, state court judges will probably not adopt
more conscientious writing habits. 24 Given their own crushing
caseload, 125 inadequate assistance1 26 and the repetitive nature of many of
the cases that appear before them, it seems unrealistic to expect that state
court judges will begin to produce precisely worded opinions. Even if
they did attempt to write more opinions, ambiguity is simply impossible
to eradicate. 127
1. ANOs
An appellate decision affirming without an opinion ("ANO") is ambig-
uous because a federal habeas court cannot determine whether the deci-
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. To the limited extent that the plain statement rule does foster judicial economy, it
does so whether or not the Court exercises jurisdiction. Federal courts no longer have to
expend effort on jurisdictional decisions. Yet adopting a presumption of jurisdiction
grants more state prisoners access to federal courts, thus swelling the federal docket and
expending judicial resources. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554 (1987) (Court disagreed about
existence of plain statement and ultimately reversed state court decision after exercising
jurisdiction).
122. See Baker, supra note 79, at 825-26. The Court may achieve at least partial suc-
cess in this area. The New York Appellate Division's First Department changed its prior
practice by instituting a policy of writing opinions for every disposition. See Parloff, 1st
Dep't Pledges to Write Opinions for All Appeals, Manhattan Law., Oct. 3, 1989-Oct. 9,
1989, at 4 (hereinafter Parloff I). Harris may well have been the impetus for such a
change. See Parloff, 'Affirmed. No Opinion. All Concur.'" Manhattan Law., Aug. 29,
1989-Sept. 11, 1989, at 19 (hereinafter Parloff II). The state court will preclude the
possibility of reversal by issuing plain statements. Most state courts, however, will not
match the First Department's example. See infra notes 121-145.
123. Baker, supra note 79, at 825-26.
124. See infra notes 128-145 and accompanying text.
125. See infra note 140.
126. Cf Mahoney, Law Clerks. For Better or Worse?, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 321, 340-42
(1984) (law clerks needed to help handle caseload growth).
127. See id. Compare O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 524, 523
N.E.2d 277, 278, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1988) (clearly indicating reliance on adequate and
independent state ground) with People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 522 n.7, 508 N.E.2d
903, 907 n.7, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 n.7 (1987) (relying on both federal and state
grounds).
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sion rests on federal or state grounds.28 Judges frequently render
ANOs. 2 9 For instance, in 1987, 92 percent of all criminal decisions and
98.5 percent of all criminal affirmances decided by the New York Appel-
late Division's First Judicial Department were rendered as ANOs.130
Indeed, a number of factors may lead judges to continue rendering
ANOs:13
1
The increases in case volume and difficulty have placed great pressure
on the judiciary. Appellate judges have sought to reduce that pressure
in a number of ways, one of the most common being to reduce the
number of opinions that they publish. Doing so, it is believed, saves
judges much valuable time because unpublished opinions require less
judicial effort to prepare. 132
Rendering a decision as an ANO saves more time than not publishing the
opinion. 33 Other rationales include reduced costs in acquiring and stor-
ing legal materials as well as simplified legal research.13 ' An ANO also
insulates state court judges from criticism by the electorate. 35
2. Ambiguous Opinions
When not using ANOs, state court judges will probably continue to
write ambiguous opinions. By rendering ambiguous opinions, state
judges can mitigate some political consequences of their decisions.1 36
For example, judges can blame a politically unpopular or sensitive deci-
sion on federal requirements.137
Ambiguous state opinion writing will also continue because perfect
128. See Robson & Mello, supra note 93, at 124; see, e.g., Booker v. Lynaugh, 872 F.2d
100, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1989) (exercising jurisdiction because Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals affirmed without opinion); Baum v. Leonardo, No. 88 Civ. 8171 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (exercising jurisdiction because New York's Ap-
pellate Division affirmed without opinion).
129. See Marvell, supra note 94, at 288, 291.
130. See Parloff I, supra note 122, at 1. The 1st Department has stated that it will
now write opinions in all cases. See Parloff I, supra note 122, at 4.
131. See Richman & Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opin-
ions: A Critique, 46 Ohio St. L. J. 313, 313 (1985).
132. Id.
133. Cf Marvell, supra note 94, at 287 (when opinion not available to public, attor-
neys, or other courts, judges can save time by writing less refined opinions); Weaver,
supra note 115, at 479 (same).
134. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 131, at 313.
135. See id. at 313-14. Even assuming that ANOs are not prevalent, state court judges
will still insulate themselves from criticism by the electorate by writing ambiguous opin-
ions. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 1, at 1378.
136. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 1, at 1379-80.
137. See generally Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1045 (1989) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (state judges frequently overprotect citizens); Bice, supra note 33, at 756-57 (dis-
cussing political motivation to write ambiguously); Matasar & Bruch, supra note 1, at
1378 ("A state judge who holds that state and federal law together compel an unpopular
result runs quite a different political risk compared to a judge who holds squarely that
state law gives greater rights than federal law."). Political motivation is also a rationale
for a judge's use of ANOs. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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clarity is difficult to achieve. 138 One commentator has noted that
"[j]udicial expression in opinion writing generally has its own limits,
[and] in difficult cases dealing with complex issues the intellectual pro-
cess is peculiarly fleeting."' 139 In addition, because the state court docket
is so large,' 40 judges cannot devote much time to careful writing.
Indeed, empirical evidence following Michigan v. Long suggests that
state courts may well continue writing ambiguous opinions. 141 After an
examination of over five hundred state cases involving constitutional
claims, one author concluded that state courts have failed to adhere to
the plain statement rule. 42 It is unlikely that Harris v. Reed will do any
more to inspire state courts to alter their habits than did Michigan v.
Long.
3. One-Sentence Statements of Reliance
Moreover, state courts may write unambiguously without substantially
changing their writing habits. State judges could plainly indicate the ba-
sis of their decision, and avoid federal habeas review, by using a one-
sentence statement of reliance. 4 3 This practice rewards state courts
without exacting further clarification in their writing. Moreover, by
briefly indicating reliance, judges erect insurmountable obstacles to fur-
ther litigation while also remaining unaccountable for their decisions.
Habeas corpus is a fundamental means of protecting a defendant's fed-
eral rights.'4 5 State courts should not be able to foreclose federal habeas
review without addressing the petitioner's case in a lucid opinion. Harris
enables state courts to accomplish this without requiring any change in
their writing habits.
138. See Baker, supra note 79, at 812; cf Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere:
Federal Courts and State Power, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1503-04 (1987) (plain statement
rule will not necessarily foster clear opinion writing).
139. Baker, supra note 79, at 812.
140. The New York Appellate Division's First Judicial Department handled 2,910
cases in 1988. The Second Judicial Department disposed of 4,489 cases. See Parloff II,
supra note 122, at 18. Through November 1989, the First Department decided 2,520
cases. During the same period, the Second Department handled 3,410 cases. See
Milonas, The Caseloads of Appellate Division Justices, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1990, at 2.
141. See Note, Fulfilling the Goals of Michigan v. Long7 The State Court Reaction, 56
Fordham L. Rev. 1041, 1042, 1068 (1988).
142. See id. at 1047, 1068.
143. See Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1044-45 n.12 (1989).
144. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 131, at 313-14; Robson & Mello, supra note
93, at 122. Using a short statement of reliance does not always deny state prisoners a
federal habeas forum. Petitioners may still obtain federal review by claiming that the
state procedural rule is not adequate and independent. See supra note 96 (Ninth Circuit
exercised jurisdiction even though state court relied on state procedural rule because state
rule not adequate). See generally Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (deter-
mining that adequacy and independence is federal question).
145. See generally L. Yackle, supra note 6, § 17 (origins of "great writ").
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B. Evisceration of the Sykes Cause and Prejudice Standard
Prior to Harris, most circuits either assumed reliance on the state
ground or attempted to interpret the state court's intention.146 These
approaches subjected a large percentage of petitioners to the cause and
prejudice test because federal courts would find or presume reliance.147
In contrast, Harris compels these federal courts to exercise habeas juris-
diction without requiring petitioner to demonstrate cause and prejudice.
Only deliberate bypasses of state procedural rules will bar petitioners
from federal court. This approach represents a return to the Noia stan-
dard, 48 and has been followed in many recent federal decisions. 49
This effective return to Noia will most likely persist. Despite Harris,
state judges will probably continue to render ambiguous decisions."o
Furthermore, even if state courts attempt to indicate reliance explicitly,
state prisoners will have greater access to federal post-conviction forums
146. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
147. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 1, at 1376.
148. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. See generally Matasar & Bruch,
supra note 1, at 1379-80 (reasons for state courts not writing opinions). The commenta-
tors note that "for myriad reasons, state courts may choose not to clarify the grounds of
their decisions. To the extent that there are many such cases, the approach of Michigan
v. Long [and thus Harris v. Reed] could increase rather than reduce the number of cases
subject to [federal adjudication]." Matasar & Bruch, supra note 1, at 1375-76.
149. See, eg., Peterson v. Scully, No. 89-2202 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Cir file) (court exercised jurisdiction because state court failed to even mention an
obvious procedural default); Thompson v. Sowders, 887 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1989) (exer-
cising jurisdiction because state court failed to rely expressly on state procedural
grounds); Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1989) (exercising jurisdiction
because state court failed to rely expressly on state procedural grounds); Evans v.
Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 123 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (court exercised jurisdiction because
state court did not plainly indicate basis of decision, even though it felt Virginia intended
to hold petitioner's claim procedurally barred), Petition for cert. filed, - U.S.L.W. -
(U.S. Sep. 27, 1989) (No. 89-516); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir.) (while
petitioner failed to preserve claim for appeal, court exercised jurisdiction because New
Mexico Court of Appeals addressed merits of petitioner's constitutional claim and did not
plainly indicate reliance on default), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 373 (1989); Owens v. Treder,
873 F.2d 604, 610-12 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Booker v. Lynaugh, 872 F.2d 100, 100-01
(5th Cir. 1989) (exercising jurisdiction because Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
without opinion).
An examination of recent New York federal district court decisions reveals the extent
to which petitioners will now have access to a federal habeas forum. See, e.g., Flores v.
Scully, No. 89 Civ. 1527 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(exercising habeas jurisdiction because the state court failed to clearly and expressly rely
on state procedural grounds); Portalatin v. Hernandez, No. 87-3630 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (same); Fernandez v. Dalsheim, No. 88 Civ.
5705 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (same); Torres v. Sulli-
van, No. 89 Civ. 0254 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file)
(same); Martin v. Jones, No. 87 Civ. 3252 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (same); Baum v. Leonardo, No. 88 Civ. 8171 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (same); Maxwell v. Smith, 722 F. Supp. 7, 8
(W.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); Fagon v. Bara, 717 F. Supp. 976, 986-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(same); Lopez v. Scully, 716 F. Supp. 736, 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); Quaratararo v.
Mantello, 715 F. Supp. 449, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y.) (same), aff'd, 888 F.2d 126 (1989).
150. See supra notes 117-145 and accompanying text.
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if those courts require plain statements. An analysis of Supreme Court
cases construing the Michigan v. Long plain statement rule suggests that
the Court requires a very clear statement of reliance before it will refuse
to exercise jurisdiction. 51 Thus, even if state courts attempt to indicate
that they relied on the state rule, petitioners will frequently obtain access
to federal habeas forums without demonstrating cause and prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The majority in Harris v. Reed ostensibly adopted the plain statement
rule to foster judicial economy and demonstrate respect for state proce-
dural rules. It is unrealistic to assume, however, that the rule will signifi-
cantly reduce the need to construe state law or examine lower court
records and appellate briefs. In addition, the plain statement rule will
eviscerate the cause and prejudice test. The resulting increase in the fed-
eral docket will offset whatever contribution Harris might make to judi-
cial efficiency.
By exercising jurisdiction and thus threatening reversal, the Court may
have hoped to induce changes in the state judiciary's writing practices.
This endeavor will not succeed. Political pressures, a voluminous
caseload and the inherent difficulty of writing unambiguously will pre-
vent the state judiciary from altering its routines. The paramount danger
is that state courts will circumvent Harris by issuing one-line plain state-
ments. While unambiguous, this type of decision would frustrate the
Court's objective. State courts will be able to deny plaintiffs a federal
forum without a cogent explanation of their reasoning.
Jason M, Halper
151. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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